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CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
MARTIN L. LINDAHL*
Gathered here are approximately 30 articles dealing with conglomerates
and conglomerate mergers.1 They are of very high quality on the whole and
present a great variety of materials and points of view. An interesting feature
of the papers is the inclusion of materials going beyond the diversified firm
operating largely in the manufacturing sector of the American economy.
Financial conglomerates and congenerics, the latter being diversified com-
panies engaged in banking and markets closely related to banking, are sub-
jected to careful analysis in papers by Peter Gutmann 2 and William Smith.3
Professor Gutmann outlines the factors accounting for the phenomenal
growth in recent times of the one-bank holding company. He reviews the
numerous possible abuses in such institutions, which range from the creation
of bank dominated economic power centers, to unfair competition in the
form of tied loans and unequal access to credit. These abuses prompted the
enactment of regulatory legislation by the House in late 1969, which if
concurred in by the Senate, spells the doom of the financial conglomerate
and greatly restricts the congeneric. Mr. Smith's essay supplements the
Gutmann piece by focusing on the prospective contributions to competitive
rivalry and consumer welfare by the financial congenerics. The appropriate
antitrust stance, in Mr. Smith's view, should be sympathetic toward di-
versification mergers, especially -where entry into promising new markets is
facilitated by the acquisition of "core" or "fringe" firms rather than those
already dominant in the related market.
Another type conglomerate, namely, the huge, complex, diversified firm
in the retail trades, is treated by Professor Hollander. 4 He finds an un-
precedented diversification at the enterprise rather than the establishment
level, and efficiencies in the large trading conglomerate that augur for the
promotion of competition and consumer welfare rather than an undesirable
concentration of economic power. Professor Hollander notes briefly the
reaction of foreign observers to the growth of trading conglomerates. Finally,
Hans Mueller5 in his essay pays brief attention to some international aspects
of and attitudes toward the development of conglomerate enterprise in
manufacturing and related fields.
An economic reappraisal of the manufacturing conglomerate at this
Emeritus Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College.
l Within the time constraints, the St. John's Law Review was able to supply ap-
proximately 20 articles to the present writer to read in preparing this note.
2 See p. 471 infra.
8 See p. 483 inIra,
4 See p. 235 infra.
5 See p. 460 infra.
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point in time is -most appropriate. The stock markets have been making such
a reassessment, and as of mid-January, the average market prices of a group
of leading conglomerate common shares stood at 52 percent of their annual
highs. Some stocks had declined as much as 60 to 75 percent from their highs
recorded within the year. The materials in the individual essays that may
serve as the basis for an evaluation may be classified in two broad categories.
Some of the papers treat virtually all aspects of the conglomerate merger
movement, whereas the others relate to some specific bit of evidence of
significance in evaluating conglomerate enterprise. Prominent in the latter
category is John Boyle's 6 painstaking and impressive analysis of pre-merger
growth and profit characteristics of acquired firms in conglomerate mergers.
He concludes that over 90 percent of the large corporations acquired in
recent years were strong and financially viable companies. They were not
"potentially" failing companies, as has been asserted, but were instead firms
fully capable of challenging the entrenched positions of larger companies
had they not been swallowed up in conglomerate mergers. Professor
Thomas Hogarty,7 without distinguishing the type of merger, also deals with
the profits of mergers. He reviews data for the period 1953-1964 and finds
that the "average merger produces zero functional gains and some mergers
produce extraordinary profits." He makes the observation that mergers
would be an attractive form of investment for "risk-takers," an apt charac-
terization, perhaps, of the managers of conglomerates.
Raymond Piccini8 finds that mergers have been a minor source of
growth for most of the hundred largest companies in the post-war period.
His group of one hundred companies contained few conglomerates, but
those large companies most actively engaged in mergers did diversify
through merger to a greater extent than the others while the firms acquired
were larger than other acquired companies. Professor John Kuhlman and
Richard Duke,9 in a well-reasoned and perceptive essay, venture the findings
that the highly-leveraged conglomerates are sensitive to adverse business
conditions, that there are no apparent real economies in the purchase and
sale of companies, and that eventually conglomerates will be forced to
adopt traditional strategies, make capital allocation decisions, and become
truly concerned with the operations of acquired companies. They see the
major problem as financial in nature, and not a reduction in competition
in the conventional sense. A restructuring of the private sector has occurred
which may or may not be a more rational economic organization. Finally,
Professor John Ferguson'0 examines the competitive effects of the product-
extension merger as illustrated by FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.," and
6 See p. 152 infra.
7 See p. 378 infra.
8 See p. 171 infra.
9 See p. 61 infra.
10 See p. 392 infr.
11 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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General Foods Corp. v. FTC.12 He is severely critical of the Federal Trade
Commission's analysis and finds that economies of scale in advertising derive
from sales in several markets, and to allow such mergers is to permit a larger
number of firms to exist in a consumer product market, thus lowering con-
centration. Both product-extension mergers and advertising are found to
benefit consumers.
Several of the essayists, notably Jules Backman,"8 L. E. Birdzell, 14 Rich-
ard A. Miller,15 and J. Fred Weston,16 present comprehensive treatments
embracing the historical, theoretical, and empirical aspects of diversified
firms. They consider at length the objections to conglomerate mergers voiced
by Corwin Edwards17 and others, some of which have afforded the basis for
antitrust actions as well as actual court decisions. The encouragement of
cross-subsidization and predatory pricing, the increased use of reciprocity
and reciprocal arrangements to promote sales, the removal of a potential
entrant into a market penetrated by merger, the increase in "deep pocket"
advantages to acquired firms, a raising of entry barriers, enhanced forebear-
ance in competitive activity among firms in the relevant market, and the
extension of monopoly power are all discussed ingeniously and exhaustively.
For the most part, the objections are found not to stand up in the light of
economic theory, business practice, and empirical evidence, or are found to
be greatly exaggerated in their anticompetitive implications. The positive
economic contributions of conglomerates in diversifying risk, invigorating
lethargic and inefficient firms, attaining a specialization in management as
between headquarters and operations executives, and instituting systems
approaches and more objective resource allocative decisions are, as Mr.
Birdzell puts it, good reasons for continuing the experiment of testing new
forms of organization in the laboratory of a free economy.
A multitude of views respecting public policy toward conglomerate
mergers will be found in the papers. Practically every author finds an op-
portunity to express a view regarding policy. Those writers who find that
conglomerate mergers have uncertain, neutral, or procompetitive effects, of
course, deplore the attempt to forestall them, often characterizing it as an
attack on "bigness" as such, and would favor a permissive policy for the
time-being at least. Professor Werner SichelI s and others see no need for
adding new legislation against conglomerates since the antitrust laws al-
ready are directed at any substantial monopoly control that conglomerate
growth may engender in any line of commerce.
Several of the papers contain new ideas, concepts, and instruments of
12 386 F.2d 936 (5d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
13 See p. 90 infra.
14 See p. 292 infra.
15 See p. 211 inIra.
16 See p. 66 infra,
17 See p. 416 infra.
18 See p. 356 infra.
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analysis for antitrust purposes. Professor John Narver,
19 for example, de-
velops new and potentially useful concepts in viewing firms as pools of
mobile or adaptable resources capable of responding readily to a range of
demand for products called a "supply space." Merging firms actually oc-
cupying the same supply space or line of commerce would be viewed as
possessing the same ability to supply, hence the merger could be identified
as horizontal even though in a static context it would be described as con-
glomerate. Supply-space analysis presented in terms of objective data would
reveal fully the competitive implications of any merger and would, it is
asserted, make it difficult for large firms seeking growth by merger in a par-
ticular supply space, yet permit mergers among small firms which will not
increase concentration but promote competition. Professor Lee Preston,
20
in a similar vein, argues that beyond the tracing of structural and behavioral
changes stemming from conglomerate mergers, the emphasis on documenta-
tion and analysis should be shifted toward a survey of the number of dif-
ferent situations in which anticompetitive effects may arise. Such a survey,
using input-output tables, might reveal potential reciprocity possibilities,
instances of potential foreclosure, and situations in which sources of poten-
tial competition have been eliminated. These competitive impacts plus their
individual probabilities and the overall probability of one or more signif-
icant effects should be taken into account in individual cases and in deter-
mining more general judicial standards. Such analytical approaches and
judicial criteria that go beyond the traditional, it is argued, are essential to
the effective application of section 7 to conglomerate mergers.
Other proposals worthy of note are those of Professor David Kamer-
schen,21 Professor Henry Einhorn,22 and Professor Charles Berry.23 Professor
Kamerschen believes that Adams' proposal, to apply the notion of the
physically integrated public utility holding company complex to reorga-
nizations of conglomerate companies having unwarranted concentrations of
economic power, is worthy of consideration. Such integration, geographic
or otherwise, would apply only to large firms and hopefully would enhance
corporate efficiency and technological progressiveness. Professor Einhorn
also borrows from the sector of regulated industries for a proposal to deal
with the inflexibility of the current evaluation and control of pure con-
glomerates. He advocates a procedure whereby each conglomerate merger
would be evaluated on its own merits and both the beneficial and the
harmful features weighed to determine its "net" economic impact. In deter-
mining whether or not mergers are in the "public interest," regulatory
agencies must probe for and recognize anticompetitive effects, but may find
economies or other benefits to the public of such significance as to override
19 See p. 316 infra.2 o See p. 341 infra.
21 See p. 133 infra.
22 See p. 451 infra.
23 See p. 266 infra.
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the anticompetitive impact. While much can be said for considering each
merger on its merits under the regulated industry procedure, there may be
some question as to the capability of courts to evaluate and weigh the dis-
parate economic factors involved. There is a real danger also that the per-
formance of the merged company will not yield the alleged benefits, and yet
result in irretrievable social losses in terms of anticompetitive consequences.
Much more acceptable in the view of this commentator are the basic
argument and the proposals supported by Professor Berry in his paper on
the conglomerate merger and economic policy. He takes issue with the gen-
eral proposition that conglomerate mergers as now defined are not capable
of creating, or at least augmenting, market power and therefore, attempts
to prevent them impose needless social costs in terms of efficiency. Professor
Berry urges that many conglomerate mergers embrace firms having market
power in industries that are not totally independent, and, where close or
even distant substitutes are involved, the degree of market power may be
enhanced in both markets. But more important is the influence of such
mergers in the "dynamics of industry structure" in eliminating the threat
of entry by large industrial corporations that are uniquely suited to sur-
mount entry barriers stemming from corporate scale requirements for suc-
cessful operation in the protected industries. While barring the merger of
large firms, there would be no objection to the actual entry of a large firm
by the acquisition of a minor firm that could strengthen its competitive
position by taking advantage of the retained earnings, the nationally known
corporate name, or the technological know-how of the acquiring company.
Berry supports, with some reservation, the proposal in the White House
Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy,24 which would limit the acquisition
by a large firm (assets of $250 million or annual sales of $500 million) of a
leading firm (one having a market share of 10 percent or more and one of
the four largest) in a concentrated market. The thrust of the merger restric-
tion would be to guide the activity of large firms in a competitive direction
that would lessen market concentration in the future and retain the salutary
impact of the threat of entry upon performance in concentrated markets.
It is quite apparent that economists have engaged in extensive investiga-
tion and hard thinking about a significant current problem in the antitrust
field. There are still wide gaps in our knowledge of conglomerate mergers,
as the writers have been quick to point out, but notable progress has been
made. The nonprofessional reader may be disappointed to find a lack of
consensus among scholars in a venerable and mature discipline like eco-
nomics. But despite the lack of agreement, the ideas presented in the papers
in this Symposium will be extremely helpful in fashioning a policy toward
conglomerate mergers which will be for the public good.
24 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969).
